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Traditional Public Utility Law and the Demise of a 
Merchant Transmission Developer 
By Meredith Hurley 
INTRODUCTION 
Due to advances in technology and the coinciding reduction in the cost of renewable 
energy sources, the United States electric power system is currently undergoing dramatic 
changes.1 The electricity grid is becoming less centralized as more distributed resources, such as 
wind and solar energy, become available to generate power.2 Concurrently, a larger number of 
private developers are looking to enter the electricity market in order to bring more energy 
sources onto the grid.3 These changes to the electricity grid are challenging incumbent utilities 
and the current regulatory construct created under traditional public utility law.4 As renewable 
energy resources continue to develop in a non-centralized manner, the jurisdictional lines 
between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and state public utility commissions  
continue to blur and overlap.5  Renewable energy resources are unconventional in how they 
produce electricity, which exacerbates the application of public utility law to their development. 
Unlike most fossil fuels, which are burned in a small number of large power plants, renewable 
energy sources are dispersed in a wide variety of areas and in much larger numbers.6  
In particular, wind energy continues to grow nationwide thanks to the federal production 
tax credit and state renewable portfolio standards.7 In 2017, wind energy became the largest 
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1 MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, UTILITY OF THE FUTURE, 10 (2016), http://energy.mit.edu/research/utility-future-study/.  
2 Id. at 2. 
3 Id. at 8.  
4 See id. (stating that renewable-energy resources are being increasingly deployed as distributed generation, which is 
disrupting the traditional “top-down” structure of the power sector); see also Pilita Clark, The Big Green Bang: How 
Renewable Energy Became Unstoppable, FIN. TIMES (May 18, 2017) https://www.ft.com/content/44ed7e90-3960-
11e7-ac89-b01cc67cfeec (noting that wind and solar projects are being built at unprecedented rates, threatening the 
business models of established power companies). 
5 See generally Giovanni S. Saarman Gonzàlez, Evolving Jurisdiction Under the Federal Power Act: Promoting 
Clean Energy Policy, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1422 (2016). 
6 See MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 29 (explaining that the primary differentiating factor of renewable-
energy resources is that their distributed nature allows them to provide services either more effectively, cheaply, or 
simply in locations inaccessible to the larger, more centralized energy resources).  
7 Energy Department Reports: Wind Energy Continues Rapid Growth in 2016, DEP’T OF ENERGY (Aug. 8, 2017), 
https://www.energy.gov/articles/energy-department-reports-wind-energy-continues-rapid-growth-2016; MOLLY F. 
SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43453, THE RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT: IN BRIEF 
1, Nov. 27, 2018, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43453.pdf (“The renewable electricity [production tax credit] is a 
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source of renewable energy capacity in the United States.8 The availability of additional wind 
resources requires the construction of new transmission lines to deliver the wind energy to urban 
areas with high demand for electricity. Unfortunately, wind energy is being curtailed due to “an 
inability to transmit power from where it is generated to where it is needed, [which] could 
degrade the potential for wind power to reduce fuel costs and emissions.” 9  Historically, 
transmission line development was controlled by public utilities, but now independent or 
merchant transmission developers are increasingly entering the market to build new transmission 
facilities. 10  Unfortunately, these new entrants into the electricity market are being treated 
similarly to the traditional vertically integrated utilities that were established decades ago.11 As 
this paper will demonstrate, the analogous treatment of two very different types of energy 
providers creates barriers to clean energy development.12 While clean energy development has 
made great strides in recent years, contemporary federalism issues and the application of 
traditional public utility law to private developers of interstate transmission lines continue to 
limit the expansion of clean energy in the United States.  
In order to highlight the barriers confronting transmission line development in the United 
States today, this Comment examines a case study of a transmission line project in the Midwest 
and analyzes how federalism issues and the application of public utility law stifled its 
development. In the case study, Clean Line Energy Partners (Clean Line), a merchant 
transmission developer, attempted to build a new transmission line through two states in order to 
transport wind energy produced in the Great Plains to the Chicago area. Clean Line was 
operating within the confines of traditional public utility law but was stymied by regulatory 
action at the state level due to a “state-centric” approach that lacked a broader perspective on the 
benefits of clean energy development. As a merchant transmission developer, Clean Line does 
not fit within the definition of a traditional public utility and, as a result, was barred from 
developing an electric transmission line in Illinois and other states.13  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
per-kilowatt-hour tax (kWh) credit for electricity generated using qualified energy resources…For wind facilities, 
the credit is available for facilities for which construction begins before January 1, 2020.”).  
8 Frank Oteri et al., Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., 2017 State of Wind Development in the United States by Region 
1 (Apr. 2018), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy18osti/70738.pdf. 
9 Jennie Jorgenson et al., Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Reducing Wind Curtailment Through Transmission 
Expansion in a Wind Vision Future iv (Jan. 2017), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/67240.pdf (“Overall, these 
results suggest that the power system can be operated with more than 35% wind penetration (and 12% solar 
penetration), but that transmission expansion is necessary to fully utilize the available renewable energy.”). 
10 Heidi Werntz, Let’s Make a Deal: Negotiated Rates for Merchant Transmission, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 
424 (2011); for more information on merchant transmission developers see infra Part II.A.  
11 See MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 36 (hypothesizing that, in order to continue to encourage clean-
energy development, a “radical deviation from the centralized paradigm that has prevailed for more than a century” 
will have to occur); see also JOEL EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 66 (4th ed. 2015) 
(explaining that a vertically integrated utility is one that owns all levels of its supply chain: the generation plants, the 
transmission wires, and the local-distribution system). 
12 See MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 38 (recognizing that increasing clean-energy development will only 
be possible in a power sector that is dramatically different than the current one, as renewable-energy providers need 
to be active participants in the operation of the power system).  
13 Steve Daniels, Supreme Court Ruling Leaves Wind-Power Line Up in the Air, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Sept. 21, 2017), 
https://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20170921/NEWS11/170929969/illinois-supreme-court-rules-on-rock-
island-clean-line-project; Jennifer DeWitt, Rock Island Clean Line: Ill. Supreme Court Ruling Stalls Transmission 
Line Project, QUAD-CITY TIMES (Sept. 23, 2017), https://qctimes.com/business/ill-supreme-court-ruling-stalls-
transmission-line-project/article_fa1baa4f-ee1e-50c6-a671-b5034178afb6.html. 
 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY                                                                [2019 
 320 
Part I of this Comment reviews the history and development of public utility law in the 
United States including the regulation of interstate transmission lines. It also explores how 
contemporary federalism conflicts have developed from the jurisdictional split between state and 
federal oversight of interstate transmission development. Part II then examines Clean Line’s 
experience in the Midwest including the barriers the company encountered while attempting to 
build large interstate transmission lines across several states. Finally, Part III contains proposed 
solutions to this problem and recommends re-assessing the jurisdictional mismatch of federal and 
state authority over transmission line development. A more regional approach to transmission 
line planning would be effective if both the states and the federal government ceded more control 
to the Regional Transmission Operators in approving new transmission lines. Moreover, states 
need to re-assess their current framework of public utility law and its application to merchant 
developer transmission projects. Following this re-assessment, it is likely that many state statutes 
will need to be amended to better incorporate new market entrants who do not meet the statutory 
definition of a public utility.  
I. BACKGROUND ON TRADITIONAL PUBLIC UTILITY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Regulation of the Electricity System 
The following Part provides background on public utility law in the United States, at both 
the state and federal level. It then addresses how the jurisdictional overlap of the interstate 
transmission system developed in the context of the state and federal public utility law 
framework.  
1. The State Regulatory Construct 
The United States has a long and varied history of managing and encouraging energy 
development. For decades, U.S. energy policy emphasized the formation of public utilities and, 
in the process, created a large body of public utility law. Historically, states granted monopoly 
power to public or private companies that were looking to build energy infrastructure and 
provide electricity to a specific geographic area.14 These companies were granted monopoly 
franchises following the basic principle that it was more economic for a single company to build 
the necessary infrastructure required to serve a regional market. 15  These electric companies 
organized primarily into large, vertically integrated utilities that individually owned and operated 
their own generation, transmission, and distribution systems.16 The companies became known as 
public utilities due to the requirement that they provide service to the public and, therefore, 
“became clothed with a public interest.”17 Thus, during this era, public utility law developed 
                                                        
14 EISEN ET AL., supra note 11, at 38. 
15 Id. 
16 See William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1628 (2014) (“What was 
distinctive in an economic sense about these industries were their high fixed-capital requirements (electric power has 
long been the most capital intensive sector of the U.S. economy), substantial economies of scale, and extensive 
reliance on a network infrastructure that was expensive to build and maintain.”).  
17 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877) (“What they did was from the beginning subject to the power of the 
body politic to require them to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the 
common good. . . . If they did not wish to submit themselves to such interference, they should not have clothed the 
public with an interest in their concerns.”) Id. at 133; CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE 
OF THE TRACKS: A REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE 
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primarily around supporting vertically integrated utilities by granting them regulated 
monopolies18 and by protecting them from competing firms.19  
In the early twentieth century, many states established state Public Utility Commissions 
(PUCs) to heavily regulate both the public utilities or investor-owned utilities.20 Utilities are 
required to seek approval from the PUC to increase the rates charged to their customers. 
Although the process is slightly different by state, most public utility state statutes require 
companies to obtain permission to operate in the state through the acquisition of a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity (CPCN).21 Similar to an incumbent public utility, a transmission 
developer must also seek approval from the PUC by securing a CPCN in order to operate within 
the regulated market22 and the CPCN may provide eminent domain power depending on the 
state.23 Generally, the “[i]ssuance of a CPCN is based on a finding by the state authority that the 
proposed project is in the public interest” and “[h]ow state authorities determine whether a 
project is in the public interest is a major factor affecting the development of projects.”24 Thus 
state PUCs are able to control the entry of new companies into the local electricity markets by 
requiring them to demonstrate, through the acquisition of a CPCN, that there is a “public need” 
for or “public interest” in the new or expanded services proposed by the new entrant.25 
Public utilities are also required to set “just and reasonable rates”26 with the expectation 
that they will receive a fair rate of return on their investments; the PUC approves the rates at a 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY 142–49 (1986) (noting that public utilities have similar characteristics of common 
carriers: they provide essential services, are natural or legal monopolies, can exercise eminent domain, are assigned 
a specific geographic-service territory by the state, and have a duty to serve the public, which originated from the 
idea that if the company desires to have an exclusive business franchise, it must provide equal access for all). 
18 Jonas J. Monast, Maximizing Utility in Electric Utility Regulation, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 135, 142–43 (2015). 
19 EISEN ET AL., supra note 11, at 60–62. 
20 See id. at 78; Robert L. Bradley, Jr., The Origins of Political Electricity: Market Failure or Political 
Opportunism?, 17 ENERGY L.J. 59, 65 (1996); EISEN ET AL., supra note 11, at 71–72 (noting that in the United 
States, there are both privately-owned utilities, which include investor-owned utilities and rural electric cooperative 
associations, and publicly-owned utilities which include federal power systems like the Tennessee Valley Authority 
and public power systems like the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power).  
21 William K. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity: Developments in the States, 
1870–1920, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 426, 427 (2008) (“The certificate of public convenience and necessity is pervasive 
in contemporary regulation of public service companies.”). 
22 JOSEPH H. ETO, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., BUILDING ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION LINES: A REVIEW OF 
RECENT TRANSMISSION PROJECTS 3 (Sept. 2016), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl-1006330.pdf. (“A CPCN is 
typically required for a transmission developer to construct facilities to transport electricity at transmission (and 
sometimes lower, sub-transmission) voltages within a state’s borders.”).  
23 EISEN ET AL., supra note 11, at 78 (explaining that in exchange for an exclusive geographic franchise, the state 
PUC charges the utility with a duty to serve and allows the utility to charge “just and reasonable” rates). 
24 ETO, supra note 22, at 3 (“Generally speaking, the way in which public interests are affected by the expected 
economic impacts of a project within the state is a primary focus of a state’s consideration.”).  
25 Jones, supra note 21, at 427 (“Even if the applicant fulfills all other pertinent requirements, the application may be 
denied if the regulatory agency concludes that the addition of the proposed services to those already available in the 
market would not be in the public interest. Thus, the essence of the [CPCN] is the exclusion of otherwise qualified 
applicants from a market because, in the judgment of the regulatory commission, the addition of new or expanded 
services would have no beneficial consequences or, in a more extreme case, would actually have harmful 
consequences.”).  
26 See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012) (referring to a statutory mandate to set “just and reasonable” rates under § 205 of 
the Federal Power Act); Patrick J. McCormick III & Sean B. Cunningham, The Requirements of the “Just and 
Reasonable” Standard: Legal Bases for Reform of Electric Transmission Rates, 21 ENERGY L.J. 389, 397 (2000) 
(“[T]he government must allow a regulated industry to earn a reasonable rate of return on its investment. This is 
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level sufficient for the utility to cover its expenses and collect a return on its investment.27 This 
kind of regulation enables utilities to secure capital at a lower cost and direct it towards their 
large, technologically complex systems.28 Under this regulatory construct, unless the investment 
is approved by the PUC, utilities cannot recover the cost of a capital investment from its 
ratepayers. 29  This is in contrast to merchant transmission developers who do not seek rate 
recovery from the PUC, but recover project costs through agreements with those who plan to use 
the transmission capacity,30 thereby assuming all market risk for a transmission project.31 In 
addition to requiring prudent investments by utilities, the state PUC customarily operates under a 
general mandate to seek the least cost option for maintaining reliable electricity service.32 State 
PUCs are also involved in approving the siting proposals for new energy infrastructure 
projects. 33  Consequently, state PUCs wield significant power over the development of the 
electricity systems within the state’s borders.34  
This regulatory regime governing public utilities that developed over a long period of time 
was designed to establish economies of scale and promote low-cost, centralized power.35 It 
represented an “unprecedented experiment in the social control of business” and struck a fair 
balance between out-right government ownership and fair regulation of a company that was 
clothed in the public interest.36 This perspective on public utility law recognized the need for a 
pragmatic approach to regulation due to the interrelation of complex factors that a utility 
manages when serving the public. 37  This perspective also depended on compromise and 
adjustment rather than a rigid response to either utility needs or public needs.38  While this 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
because an unreasonably low rate would effect an unconstitutional taking of the industry owners’ property without 
just compensation.”).  
27 Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting Public Utility Commissions to Meet Twenty-First 
Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371, 382 (2014).  
28 Boyd, supra note 16, at 1643.  
29 Scott, supra note 27, at 382 (explaining that seeking recovery of investments in traditional utility assets and 
infrastructure such as generation and transmission facilities is easier for a utility than other projects that may be 
deemed more progressive or risky). 
30 Joseph H. Eto, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB, PLANNING ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION LINES: A REVIEW OF 
RECENT REGIONAL TRANSMISSION PLANS, 3 (Sept. 2016), 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/Planning%20Electric%20Transmission%20Lines--
A%20Review%20of%20Recent%20Regional%20Transmission%20Plans.pdf.  
31 Werntz, supra note 10, at 424.  
32 Monast, supra note 18, at 146–47. 
33 See id. at 145 (explaining how the least-cost framework also provides significant discretion to the state PUC in 
determining whether an electric utility’s decisions are in the public’s best interest). 
34 Scott, supra note 27, at 375 (noting that “regulatory commissions have significant power to determine how and 
when the electric utility grid will evolve, the types of generation facilities that will be constructed, and the amount of 
money and capital investment that will be expended toward various resource options, including renewables and 
energy efficiency”). 
35 See id. at 385 (“Based on the regulatory compact, regulation of electric utilities by state public utility commissions 
developed in the early twentieth century with a multi-faceted purpose: (1) to ensure that customers had access to 
safe, reliable service; (2) to prevent discrimination against certain classes of customers; and (3) to ensure that the 
cost of service rendered under monopoly conditions remained reasonable.”). 
36 Boyd, supra note 16, at 1645 (quoting Robert Lee Hale as characterizing utility regulation as a regulatory 
experiment that deserved a fair trial as a substitute for government ownership and operation). 
37 Id. at 1647 
38 Id. (quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter, who said that public-utility law had “made possible, within a selected field, 
a degree of experimentation in governmental direction of economic activity of vast import and beyond any historical 
parallel”). 
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regulatory structure worked extremely well for the traditional public utility that operated 
centralized power plants in a confined service territory, as technology continues to advance and 
more private companies enter the electricity market, cracks have appeared in this regulatory 
framework.39  
As the next section will further explain, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) oversees the interstate transmission of electricity and wholesale energy sales, which are 
sold by generators, including utilities, on the open market. Despite FERC’s oversight in this area, 
state PUCs exert the greater power and authority within each state over traditional public utilities 
and over the application of public utility law to the evolving electric industry.40 While the current 
public utility construct has experienced considerable success over the past century, more 
adjustments may be needed as the electric power system becomes more decentralized and as 
more customers can generate their own power. 
2. The Federal Regulatory Construct 
Although the state PUC regulatory construct made perfect sense for governing local public 
utilities and the sale of electricity within one state’s borders, it quickly became apparent that a 
different regulatory construct was needed for interstate electricity sales. In 1927, the Supreme 
Court established a jurisdictional line between federal and state regulatory commissions when it 
held that the Dormant Commerce Clause barred states from regulating interstate sales of 
electricity.41 Shortly following this decision, Congress enacted the Federal Power Act (FPA), 
which provided the Federal Power Commission, the predecessor to FERC, with exclusive 
authority to regulate the transmission and sales of interstate electricity.42 From this moment 
forward, federal jurisdiction controlled wholesale electricity and interstate transmission while 
state jurisdiction controlled retail electricity sales directly to consumers within a state.43  
The next significant federal regulatory change came with the passage of the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), which encouraged the formation of independent 
power producers that could produce and sell electricity despite not being designated as public 
utilities.44 Section 210 of PURPA was the provision through which Congress intended to reduce 
or remove the monopoly barriers constructed to protect the traditional public utility and allow 
                                                        
39 See MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 36 (stating that the centralized-utility model has started to fray 
along with the introduction of competitive generation by a diverse set of actors with new and different business 
models for providing electricity to consumers).  
40 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2015) (“The Commission (FERC) . . . shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for 
the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric 
energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the 
transmitter.”). 
41 See Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1927) (closing the 
“Attleboro gap” with the purpose of regulating activities and transactions which states lacked the authority to 
regulate and holding that interstate transactions could only by regulated by Congress), abrogated by Quill Corp. v. 
N.D. ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
42 16 U.S.C. § 824; see also Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 767, 
780–81 (2016) (explaining that § 201 of the FPA gave the Federal Power Commission the power to regulate the 
“sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce”). 
43 Gonzàlez, supra note 5, at 1432–33.  
44 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645 (2012); see also EISEN ET AL., supra note 
11, at 73 (recognizing that the power generation sector did not represent a natural monopoly and could be regulated 
in a way that encouraged prices to be set by the market instead of by a state PUC).  
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new entrants into the generation sector.45 This change provided renewable energy developers and 
independent power producers with the opportunity to enter the electricity generation market and 
compete with incumbent public utilities.46 Fortunately, these regulatory changes were effective 
in increasing competition in the generation sector and, as of today, independent power producers 
represent more than 40% of the power generation supply in the United States.47 Despite the 
successful opening of the generation sector to non-utility participants, the transmission sector has 
not been similarly successful at encouraging the entrance of new market entrants due to 
overlapping state and federal oversight.   
3. The Interstate Transmission System 
Historically, electricity transmission service was thought to be a natural monopoly due to 
the inefficiency of constructing duplicate wire systems between two geographic points.48 But, the 
federal Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992) expanded FERC’s authority over transmission 
access enabling it to push the industry towards open access and increased competition.49 The first 
major decision following EPAct 1992 came a year later when FERC voted unanimously to 
require a utility, Florida Power & Light, to transmit or “wheel” other utilities’ power using its 
own transmission lines.50 Through this decision, FERC indicated that it was looking to create a 
competitive market for transmission owners and users. Despite FERC’s desire to increase 
transmission access, utilities were still stifling competition and letting available grid capacity go 
unused.51 Shortly following this decision, FERC issued two regulatory orders that continue to 
have a significant impact on the current structure of the transmission system.  
First in 1996, FERC issued Order No. 888, which required all public utilities to file open 
access non-discriminatory transmission tariffs with the objective of opening up the power supply 
markets to competition. 52  The objective of this Order was to require utilities to provide 
comparable service “to third-party users of their transmission systems.”53 This Order allowed 
other companies to transmit electricity across states despite not owning their own transmission 
systems by enabling them to transmit power on utility-owned transmission systems. Through 
Order No. 888, FERC also pushed for inter-utility open access plans by encouraging the 
formation of Independent System Operators (ISOs), which are organizations that “have regional 
                                                        
45 See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 210, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended 
at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2012)) (authorizing FERC to encourage new entrants into the market by requiring utilities to 
purchase or sell electricity from qualifying facilities); EISEN ET AL., supra note 11, at 631.  
46 See Gonzàlez, supra note 5, at 1435 (“The [qualified-facilities] program created an avenue for non-utility 
generators to sell electricity, marking the beginning of wholesale competition. This dramatically reduced the barriers 
to entry in the electricity generation market.”). 
47 EISEN ET AL., supra note 11, at 633.  
48 David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 417, 
422 (2005).  
49 EISEN ET AL., supra note 11, at 641. 
50 See Fla. Mun. Power Agency, 65 FERC ¶ 61,125 (1993) (order noting and granting interventions) (emphasizing in 
the order that the rates and conditions by which service was offered had to be nondiscriminatory and comparable to 
what the utility offered its own customers). 
51 Paul K. Joskow, Transmission Policy in the United States, CENTER FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
RESEARCH, 19 (2004), https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/45025/2004-017.pdf?sequence=1.  
52 EISEN ET AL., supra note 11, at 642.  
53 Regional Transmission Organizations, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285, at 12–13 (1999). 
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control of a transmission grid and act independently of generators and will thus not favor certain 
generators over others for use of the grid.”54 
Three years later, FERC issued Order No. 2000 advancing the development of ISOs by 
updating the standards required for qualifying as a regional organization and identifying them as 
Regional Transmission Operators (RTOs) that would help with managing transmission lines at a 
regional instead of state level.55 “Both ISOs and RTOs are non-profit organizations that control 
large portions of the transmission grid” by operating transmission lines owned by the utilities.56 
The RTOs and ISOs do not own the transmission lines they manage, but utilities cede control of 
their own transmission lines so that the regional operators can better manage the grid on a 
nondiscriminatory basis.57 As Order No. 2000 stated, “[r]egional institutions can address the 
operational and reliability issues now confronting the industry, and eliminate any residual 
discrimination in transmission services that can occur when the operation of the transmission 
system remains in the control of a vertically integrated utility.”58 While FERC requires ISOs and 
RTOs to conduct long-term planning for necessary grid expansion, the regional operators do not 
currently have independent authority to site new transmission lines.59 The distinction between 
RTOs having the authority to operate transmission lines as opposed to siting transmission lines is 
important and leads to federalism conflicts addressed later in this paper.  
Parallel to this federal regulatory framework, the majority of states grant transmission 
siting authority to their PUCs to review and approve both electric generation facilities and 
transmission lines constructed within their borders.60 As noted earlier, this normally requires the 
utility or private developer to acquire a CPCN, which can involve significant oversight and 
review by the state PUC.61 State PUCs have substantial influence over private developers who 
seek to develop transmission projects within a state because they are able to restrict the access of 
CPCNs to companies that have “public utility status.”62 Moreover, most states require a company 
to acquire a CPCN before it can utilize the power of eminent domain, which may be required to 
acquire land in the approved path of the transmission line.63 If state law or state PUCs restrict 
CPCN ownership to only companies with a “public utility” designation, then the states can use 
that designation as a barrier to new entrants looking to gain access to their electricity market. 
                                                        
54 EISEN ET AL., supra note 11, at 652. 
55 Regional Transmission Organizations, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285, at 1 (1999). 
56 EISEN ET AL., supra note 11, at 652 (noting that with few exceptions, “ISOs and RTOs are essentially the same—
RTOs are simply those organizations approved by FERC under the year 2000 standards, as opposed to the 1999 
standards.”). 
57 See EISEN ET AL., supra note 11, at 652; Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project of 
Decarbonization, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1067, 1079 (2018) (“These entities would be ‘independent grid management 
organizations’ in charge of managing the transmission grid and running electricity markets to procure and dispatch 
least-cost electricity across the region.”). 
58 See Regional Transmission Organizations, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285, at 3 (1999) (noting that the FERC would provide 
the regulatory flexibility to accommodate such an improvement).  
59 EISEN ET AL., supra note 11, at 652. 
60 Alexandra B. Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional Approach to Siting Transmission Lines, 48 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895, 1916 (2015). 
61 Id.  
62 James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. Smith, Regulatory Federalism and Development of Electric Transmission: A 
Brewing Storm?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 71, 84 (2014) (discussing how PUC commissioners have significant influence over 
the ability of new companies to develop transmission projects within a state by refusing to designate the company as 
a “public utility,” thereby preventing it from obtaining a CPCN or gaining eminent-domain authority).  
63 Klass, supra note 60, at 1916–17. 
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Thus, the state PUC remains heavily involved in interstate electric transmission development 
despite the federal push for more regional and national oversight.64 
Due to the nature of local or regional development by public utilities in the early part of the 
twentieth century, there was minimal pressure on Congress to establish federal jurisdiction in this 
area.65 As this section has demonstrated, the delivery of electricity on existing transmission lines 
is now open and competitive, but the approval of new transmission lines remains strictly within 
the domain of the state PUCs. The next section reviews how the overlap between state and 
federal jurisdiction over transmission line development results in federalism conflicts, which 
ultimately either inhibits or delays the development of interstate electric transmission lines.  
B. Contemporary Federalism Issues Over the Siting of Interstate Transmission Development 
 
1. Federal Siting Authority 
While FERC has exclusive authority to regulate wholesale electricity sales and its 
jurisdiction extends to all electricity transmission facilities in interstate commerce, it has 
extremely limited power in siting new transmission lines within individual states.66 In 2005, 
Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) which created limited federal 
siting authority to address transmission congestion.67 EPAct 2005 directed the Department of 
Energy (DOE) to conduct transmission congestion studies every three years and to formally 
designate congested areas as National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (NIETCs).68 
Under Section 1221 of EPAct 2005, FERC could also exercise siting authority for designated 
areas if a state declined to approve a transmission line within a designated NIETC.69 Ideally, this 
provision would have enabled the DOE to unilaterally issue permits to developers in specific 
circumstances for the construction of transmission projects, even after the denial of the project 
by the state PUC.70 
Unfortunately, despite Congress’s instructions for FERC to exercise this “back-stop” siting 
authority under Section 1221 for transmission lines in congested areas,71 federal appellate court 
decisions following the passage of EPAct 2005 significantly limited both the DOE and FERC’s 
                                                        
64 See id. at 1916 (noting that “although FERC has jurisdiction over wholesale power sales in interstate commerce 
and transmission of electricity in interstate commerce, states retain jurisdiction over retail electricity sales and the 
siting, approval, and grant of eminent domain authority for virtually all transmission lines, including interstate 
transmission lines”).  
65 Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in Energy Transportation, 41 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 436 (2017). 
66 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2015), (“The [FERC] shall have jurisdiction over all facilities for such transmission or 
sale of electric energy, but shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or 
over facilities used in local distribution . . . .”). 
67 Klass, supra note 60, at 1918.  
68 Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2012). 
69 Klass, supra note 60, at 1918 (noting that § 1221 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 added § 216 to the Federal 
Power Act, providing for the designation of NIETCs in order to strengthen federal jurisdiction in areas that are in 
need of electric-transmission development).   
70 Thomas Hutton, Energy Policy Act § 216: A Power Worth Preserving, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 11002, 11003 (2009), 
https://elr.info/sites/default/files/articles/39.11002.pdf. 
71 Id. at 11003 (“Within NIETCs, the Secretary has the special ability, under certain circumstances, to unilaterally 
issue permits to developers for the construction of transmission projects, even over the objections of state siting 
authorities.”). 
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authority in this area.72 First, the Fourth Circuit held in Piedmont Environmental Council v. 
FERC that FERC’s authority over transmission siting was limited to circumstances where the 
state PUC did not have authority to act or where the state PUC acted inappropriately by 
including overly-stringent conditions on the permit.73 This effectively limited FERC’s authority 
to issue a federal permit even after it was rejected by a state PUC.74  
Following this decision, in California Wilderness Coalition v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, the 
Ninth Circuit invalidated the DOE’s designation of a congested area as a NIETC due to its 
failure to consult with affected states when making the designation. 75  Challengers of the 
designation argued that the federalization of the transmission permitting process would “allow 
[federal] regulators to make critical decisions about local land use in a vacuum of political 
accountability,” which ultimately would burden the smaller, local population for the benefit of 
the larger, distant population.76 These decisions effectively limited FERC’s authority in siting 
transmission lines and re-affirmed state PUCs’ authority in this area. Unfortunately, this also 
resulted in “no strong or coordinated central planning authority for transmission in the United 
States.”77  
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, FERC issued Order No. 1000, 78  which again 
attempted to remove barriers to transmission development and to provide more opportunities to 
update the grid in order to help states achieve lower emissions as well as incorporate more 
renewable energy resources. The more controversial element of Order No. 1000 was that it 
eliminated the “right of first refusal,” which had originally provided an incumbent utility the 
right to build any new transmission line within its own footprint.79 Instead, Order No. 1000 
encouraged any qualified entity, public or private, to bid on the construction of a transmission 
line.80 The Order also required RTOs to “provide for the consideration of transmission needs 
driven by public policy requirements in the local and regional transmission planning 
processes.”81 Under Order No. 1000, RTOs were required to consider local and regional needs in 
their transmission planning processes, but unfortunately the participant utilities were not 
obligated to follow what the transmission planning studies found. 
FERC Order No. 1000 was a step in the right direction, but states still retain significant 
authority over the development and siting of new transmission lines despite the fact that modern 
day transmission lines are usually multi-state endeavors that feed into large, multi-state power 
                                                        
72 See id. at 11004 (noting that the decision “significantly diluted the potency of § 216” and that the court held “on 
plain language grounds that ‘withholding approval’ [of a corridor project] does not include a state commission’s 
affirmative rejection of a permit application.”). 
73 Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 324 (4th Cir. 2009); Hutton, supra note 66, at 11004. 
74 Hutton, supra note 70, at 11004. 
75 See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011). 
76 Hutton, supra note 70, at 11004. 
77 Miriam Fischlein et al., States of Transmission: Moving Towards Large-Scale Wind Power, 56 ENERGY POL’Y 
101, 103 (2013). 
78 Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 136 FERC 
61,051 (2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35.28 (2018)). 
79 See Steven Ferrey, Supreme Court Strips States of Their Power over the World’s Second Most Important 
Technology, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 315, 338 (2017); FERC Order 1000: Five Things You Need to Know, T&D 
WORLD (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.tdworld.com/substations/ferc-order-1000-five-things-you-need-know (“Under 
FERC 1000 . . . , no utility, Regional Transmission Organization (RTO), Independent System Operator (ISO) or 
other entity solely ‘owns’ the right to construct and/or operate transmission facilities. Any qualified entity, private or 
public, can bid on construction and/or services.”). 
80 FERC Order 1000: Five Things You Need to Know, supra note 75. 
81 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, at 1. 
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markets organized by the RTOs.82 Even though Congress attempted to extend federal jurisdiction 
over electric transmission development, EPAct 2005 did not result in shifting siting authority 
away from state PUCs.83 Ultimately, this has resulted in a substantial mismatch between the need 
for continued national transmission grid expansion and the expansive state regulatory siting 
authority over new transmission lines.  
2. State Siting Authority 
FERC has broad jurisdiction over transmission facilities that move electricity in interstate 
commerce, but the Federal Power Act makes federal and state powers “complementary” so that 
there is no room for private interests to undermine the public welfare.84 While the jurisdictional 
lines are less than clear in this area, as discussed earlier, federal precedent indicates that the 
siting of new transmission lines is generally not within the FERC’s authority.85 Instead, both 
Congress and the courts left significant authority to the states to manage and regulate the siting 
of new transmission lines.86 Either state PUCs or review boards analyze and determine whether a 
proposed energy project as a whole is in the public interest.87 Therefore, a merchant transmission 
developer planning to construct an interstate transmission line must seek permission for siting 
and eminent domain authority from each state through which a new transmission line will be 
constructed.88 
By design, state PUCs tend to be more state-centric and focused on the individual state’s 
economic and energy issues in order to ensure that the energy project will benefit the state’s 
electricity ratepayers.89 As a result of this perspective, state PUCs often do not consider the 
broader benefits to the regional or national electric grid when evaluating new interstate electric 
transmission lines.90 Even if a specific transmission line project were included in a regional 
transmission plan (likely created by an RTO under Order No. 1000), the inclusion does not 
necessarily replace the need for an independent finding by the state PUC that the project serves 
the public interest. 91  Moreover, the negative effects resulting from the construction of a 
transmission line, including the impact of the line on property values, environmental impacts to 
the land, and obstructed views, exacerbate the state-centric perspective.92 Depending on the state 
statute, PUCs may not even be able to consider broader regional benefits, but instead must accept 
                                                        
82 Hoecker & Smith, supra note 62, at 79. 
83 Klass, supra note 60, at 1920. 
84 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 780 (2016) (“The [FPA] makes federal and state powers 
‘complementary’ and ‘comprehensive,’ so that ‘there [will] be no ‘gaps’ for private interests to subvert the public 
welfare.”) (citing FPC v. La. Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 631 (1972)).  
85 Id. 
86 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 24 (2002). 
87 Hoecker & Smith, supra note 62, at 82 (noting that state PUCs have considerable power through their ability to 
approve or disapprove the siting of a new electric-transmission line and listing forty states that require permits and 
siting approval for electric-transmission lines within their borders). 
88 Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1079, 1101 (2013).   
89 Klass, supra note 60, at 1917 (noting that the regional or national benefits of interstate-transmission lines may 
overshadow any in-state benefits, which is especially true for long-distance transmission lines designed to bring 
wind energy from several states away). 
90 Id.  
91 ETO, supra note 22, at 3.  
92 Id. 
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or reject the project based on in-state transmission needs or in-state benefits.93 If the reviewing 
PUC is in a pass-through state for the transmission line, the regulators will not have a large 
incentive to approve the project.94 
As noted earlier, state PUCs can exert even more influence over private developers by 
refusing to designate them as a “public utility,” which is often a pre-requisite for obtaining a 
CPCN to construct and operate any kind of energy infrastructure in the state.95 It is generally 
understood that transmission operators need a CPCN not only to operate within the state, but also 
to exercise the power of eminent domain if it fails to reach voluntary agreements with all 
landowners along the transmission line path. 96  This state-centric perspective that regulators 
harbor has resulted in several states blocking interstate electric transmission projects by merchant 
developers that have the ability to increase the integration of clean energy resources in the 
United States.97  
Part I has demonstrated how the current regulatory framework governing the electricity 
grid developed between the states and the federal government over time. For most of the United 
States’ history, this framework was successful at encouraging and managing the growth of public 
utilities, but it is now being challenged by new market entrants looking to build interstate 
transmission lines. Part II will review the application of this regulatory framework to a merchant 
transmission developer to analyze and better understand where the construct is failing.  
II. CLEAN LINE ENERGY PARTNERS CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
This Part describes the experience of one merchant transmission developer, Clean Line 
Energy Partners (Clean Line), that attempted to develop new, long-haul transmission lines in 
several different regions across the United States.98 Founded in 2009, Clean Line’s goal was to 
construct high voltage direct current transmission lines, which would enable the integration of 
more renewable energy resources on the grid while also reducing power line losses due to 
                                                        
93 See id. at 24 (“The state-centric public-interest issue that arises most vividly for multi-state transmission projects 
involves the so-called ‘fly-over’ states. . . . The public-interest issue raised by states in the middle is that, at bottom, 
they are being asked to bear significant portions of the cost or adverse impacts of a project, yet they do not believe 
they are being provided with sufficient opportunities to share in the benefits of the project.”); Alexandra B. Klass, 
Expanding the U.S. Electric Transmission and Distribution Grid to Meet Deep Decarbonization Goals, 47 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 10749, 10756 (2017).  
94 See ETO, supra note 22, at 24; Klass, supra note 93, at 10756 (“Thus, a project that transmits power generated in 
one state, passes through a second state, and serves load in a third state could have difficulty winning approval from 
regulators in the second state.”). 
95 See Klass, supra note 93, at 10756 (stating that both Kentucky and Arkansas PUCs have construed state law such 
that an entity either not providing state-regulated rates or one that does not serve customers within its borders cannot 
qualify as a utility within the state); see also ETO, supra note 22, at 3 (“Merchant transmission projects must also 
obtain a state permit to operate as a public utility within the state. To grant such a permit, the state agency 
considering this permit must usually make a public interest finding similar to that described above [for CPCNs].”). 
96 Klass, supra note 60, at 1916–17. 
97 Klass & Rossi, supra note 65, at 440.  
98 Clean Line Energy Partners was pursuing five different electric-transmission-line projects in the United States 
prior to closing its business in 2019. Clean Line’s website states: “The existing transmission system was created 
primarily as a result of local utility planning to connect population centers with nearby fossil fuel power plants; it is 
now insufficient to meet the demands of our new energy economy. We need long-haul HVDC transmission lines to 
move America’s vast renewable energy resources to market.” CLEAN LINE ENERGY, 
https://www.cleanlineenergy.com. 
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increased efficiency. 99  Unfortunately, Clean Line’s experience as a merchant transmission 
developer is an example of how the current regulatory framework creates barriers to transmission 
line development—as of February 2019, Clean Line was disbanded and sold off all of its assets 
to other companies.100 At its peak, Clean Line had “five long-distance high-voltage transmissions 
line projects started that were projected to carry 16.5 gigawatts of wind energy across the US.”101 
Clean Line’s experience in numerous states demonstrates the ways in which transmission 
projects are stagnated by the improper application of public utility law to merchant transmission 
developers, and how the federal-state jurisdictional mismatch exacerbates the problem. By 
understanding these experiences, the regulatory community should recognize the changes that 
need to be made to the transmission line development and siting process in order to better 
encourage clean energy development.  
A. Merchant Transmission Developer Projects 
As the development of and demand for more renewable energy grows, new companies are 
trying to enter the electricity market and offer services different from those offered by traditional 
public utilities. Merchant transmission developers are attempting to enter the interstate 
transmission space to develop new transmission projects that are independent from the traditional 
public utility infrastructure.102 A merchant transmission developer, such as Clean Line, is not a 
public utility and therefore is not eligible to recover any of its construction costs through cost-
based rates paid by ratepayers. 103  Merchant transmission developers are private companies, 
commonly backed by private investors, and assume the risk of their large, capital-intensive 
projects.104 Despite these significant differences, merchant transmission developers continue to 
be regulated under traditional public utility law.  
B. Clean Line’s Rock Island Transmission Line 
Clean Line created a subsidiary, Rock Island, to both manage and construct an electric 
transmission line from O’Brien County in northwest Iowa to Grundy County in northeast 
                                                        
99 Klass, supra note 93, at 10754; Aaron Larson, Benefits of High-Voltage Direct Current Transmission Systems, 
POWERMAG, Aug. 1, 2018, https://www.powermag.com/benefits-of-high-voltage-direct-current-transmission-
systems/ (noting the advantages of HVDC transmission lines including higher efficiencies in transmitting power 
over long distances thereby reducing line losses).  
100 Ros Davidson, Ambitious Clean Line Energy ‘Wrapping Up’, WIND POWER MONTHLY (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1523646/ambitious-clean-line-energy-wrapping-up (“The Houston-
based firm now has no employees and will close down for good once the sale of the Grain Belt Express assets to 
Invenergy is completed.”).  
101 Id. 
102 See generally Louis Pitre, FERC Order 1000, What Does It Mean to Clean Line?, CLEAN LINE ENERGY (June 18, 
2012), https://web.archive.org/web/20170907191944/http://www.cleanlineenergy.com/blog/entry/ferc-order-1000. 
103 Ill. Landowners All., NFP v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 90 N.E.3d 448, 452 (Ill. 2017). 
104 ETO, supra note 30, at 3. 
 
A merchant transmission project does not seek rate recovery through a regional transmission 
planning process but instead recovers its costs through agreements negotiated directly with those 
seeking to use the transmission capacity that the project provides. Thus, the involvement of 
merchant transmission projects in regional transmission planning processes differs from the 
involvement of transmission developers who seek rate recovery through these regional processes. 
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Illinois. 105  The Rock Island transmission line was projected to deliver approximately 3,500 
megawatts of electricity from Iowa to Illinois, which was expected to be able to power more than 
1.4 million homes with wind energy.106 The project was estimated to cost approximately $1.8 
billion to construct, operate, and maintain.107 Since the transmission line was to be constructed 
across two states, Clean Line first needed approval from FERC, which approved Clean Line’s 
proposal to pre-subscribe up to 75% of the proposed line’s transmission capacity to anchor 
customers who would commit to purchasing the wind energy and allowed the remaining 25% to 
be sold at auction.108 Once Clean Line acquired FERC’s approval, it started the process of 
seeking regulatory approval for the transmission line in both Iowa and Illinois.  
1. Regulatory Barriers in Iowa 
After three years of meetings with landowners, environmental agencies, government 
officials, and other stakeholders to gather feedback on the project, Clean Line formally requested 
approval of a route through Iowa.109 Under state law, Iowa’s PUC approves transmission projects 
by holding a single hearing where it determines the need for the project, the specific route of the 
transmission line, and reviews any eminent domain requests associated with it.110 Clean Line 
requested that the Iowa PUC split this process into two parts: first, the review of the project and 
proposed route, and then second, the review of any eminent domain requests.111 Unlike public 
utilities, which can recover the cost of contacting landowners regarding the potential route of a 
new transmission line, Clean Line was unable to make such a large up-front investment without 
knowing whether the project would be approved by the PUC.112  Under Iowa’s single-stage 
approval process, Clean Line would have been forced to complete right-of-way acquisitions for 
the transmission route prior to project approval, which it was not willing or able to do.113  
Clean Line also faced legislative barriers in Iowa following its requests to the Iowa PUC to 
bifurcate the review process. Most notably, in December of 2015, twenty-four Republican 
members of the Iowa House wrote an opinion piece in the Des Moines Register warning Clean 
Line that they opposed the use of eminent domain along the route and would pass legislation to 
keep them from doing so.114 This statement was made in opposition to Iowa’s rapidly expanding 
                                                        
105 Ill. Landowners All., NFP v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 60 N.E.3d 150, 153 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016), aff’d, 90 N.E.3d 
448 (Ill. 2017). 
106 Overview, ROCK ISLAND CLEAN LINE, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20171020091523/http:/www.rockislandcleanline.com/site/home.  
107 Id. 
108 Ill. Landowners All., 90 N.E.3d at 453. 




110 Karen Uhlenhuth, Why Clean Line Developers Want Changes to Iowa’s Approval Process, MIDWEST ENERGY 




113 Karen Uhlenhuth, Proposed Wind-Energy Transmission Line Hits a Roadblock in Iowa, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS 
(Nov. 18, 2015), http://midwestenergynews.com/2015/11/18/proposed-wind-energy-transmission-line-hits-a-
roadblock-in-iowa/. 
114 Rep. Bobby Kaufmann, An Open Letter to Rock Island Clean Line from Lawmakers, DES MOINES REG. (Dec. 17, 
2015), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/iowa-view/2015/12/17/open-letter-rock-island-
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wind energy industry and Clean Line’s argument that “the project would drive demand for wind 
turbine components that are manufactured in Iowa and would ‘generate millions of dollars in 
state and local tax revenues.’”115  
While pursuing approval for the transmission line in Iowa, Clean Line was simultaneously 
pursuing approval of the project in Illinois. Due to delays in the regulatory approval process in 
Illinois, Clean Line was forced to file a notice with the Iowa PUC explaining that pending the 
outcome in Illinois, it would likely withdraw its application from the Iowa review process.116 
Unfortunately in 2017, making good on their promise, the Iowa legislature “enacted a law that 
prohibit[ed] the use of eminent domain for high-voltage transmission lines,” ultimately forcing 
Clean Line to permanently withdraw its application for the project.117  
2. Regulatory Barriers in Illinois 
Clean Line’s experience in Illinois was very different from its experience in Iowa. Notably, 
the regulatory barriers experienced in Illinois were not caused by the state PUC or the state 
legislature, but by Illinois state courts applying traditional state public utility law to Clean Line 
as a merchant transmission developer.  
In Illinois, acquiring a CPCN is required before a merchant transmission developer may be 
designated as a “transmission public utility” and before it may begin constructing, operating, or 
maintaining the electric transmission line.118 In 2014, Clean Line filed an application for a CPCN 
with the state PUC, known as the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC),119 for the Rock Island 
project so that it could operate as a “transmission-only public utility” in Illinois.120 In order to 
finance the project, Clean Line planned to enter into long-term financing agreements with one or 
more wind generators or “anchor tenants” and use them as collateral to attract lenders.121 Clean 
Line emphasized that it was assuming the market risk for the project and admitted that the wind 
generators utilized in its energy and financial simulation models did not exist yet.122 
At the evidentiary hearing in front of the ICC, witnesses for Clean Line testified that due to 
state renewable portfolio standards in several Midwestern states, including Illinois, demand for 
electricity from wind sources would remain high and, therefore, would provide demand for 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
clean-line-lawmakers/77492872/ (“You are not a utility. You have no intention of letting Iowans plug in to your 
project, nor do you plan to sell us power along your route. We hope that it doesn’t have to come to us passing 
legislation to keep you in check, but we will if it has to come to that.”).  
115 Brianne Pfannenstiel, Rock Island Clean Line Withdraws Petition for Iowa Wind Project, DES MOINES REG. 
(Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2016/12/22/rock-island-clean-line-
withdraws-petition-iowa-wind-project/95756496/.  
116 Id. 
117 Robert Bryce, The Antithesis of Green, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 9, 2019), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/01/green-new-deal-renewable-energy-cannot-meet-needs/. 
118 See 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/8-406(a)–(b) (2015) (authorizing private developers to operate as a transmission-
only public utility in Illinois and to construct, operate, and maintain an electric-transmission line for wind energy). 
119 In Illinois, the state public-utility commission is known as the Illinois Commerce Commission.  
120 Ill. Landowners All., NFP v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 60 N.E.3d 150, 153 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016), aff’d, 90 N.E.3d 
448 (Ill. 2017).  
121 See Ill. Landowners All., 60 N.E.3d at 154 (noting that in its filing with the ICC, Rock Island stressed that it was 
a merchant developer and, therefore, Illinois residents would not pay for the transmission line through any rate 
assessments and stated that it was not seeking cost recovery through traditional electric rates). 
122 Id. at 155.  
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Clean Line’s transmission services.123 The President of Clean Line also testified that, at the time 
the CPCN application was filed with the ICC, and at the time of the hearing, that Clean Line did 
not “own, control, operate, or manage any transmission plants, equipment, or property in 
Illinois.”124 On behalf of its members, the Illinois Landowners Association intervened in Clean 
Line’s filing with the ICC and argued that Clean Line did not qualify as a public utility under 
Section 3-105 of the Illinois Public Utilities Act, and therefore could not acquire a CPCN for its 
Rock Island project in the state. 125 The Commission’s administrative law judge (ALJ) denied 
their motion and ruled that “the application process under Section 8-406 of the Act is not limited 
to entities that are already certified public utilities” and, therefore, Rock Island could seek 
certification for its project. 126  Ultimately, the ICC granted Clean Line a CPCN to conduct 
business as a transmission public utility in Illinois and to construct the Rock Island transmission 
line over its preferred route.127 The ICC also agreed with the ALJ that Clean Line, through its 
Rock Island project, met the qualifications of a public utility under section 3-105(a) of the Public 
Utilities Act.128 
Several stakeholders, including the local public utility, challenged the Commission’s order 
in an appeal claiming that the ICC lacked authority to grant a CPCN because Clean Line was not 
a public utility, and that the findings of the ICC were not supported by substantial evidence.129 
While reviewing the ICC’s decision, the Illinois Appellate Court addressed the two prongs 
required for attaining public utility status: (1) a company must own or operate utility assets, 
directly or indirectly, within Illinois; and (2) it must offer those assets for public use.130 The court 
found that Clean Line did not fulfill either requirement.131 It also found that since there was no 
way to know if an Illinois energy generator would submit a successful bid for the 25% of 
transmission capacity available for auction on the transmission line, Clean Line had failed to 
satisfy the Illinois statute’s public use requirement.132 The court held that since Clean Line was 
                                                        
123 See id. (pointing to the imposed mandates that require utilities to replace fossil fuels with renewable-energy 
resources and the fact that at least 75% of that renewable energy comes from wind power). 
124 Id.  
125 See id. (testifying that the Illinois Landowners Association (ILA) is a non-profit entity composed of 
approximately 300 members who own or have an interest in the land impacted by the transmission-line project). 
126 See id. at 154 (The ALJ stated that construing the statute to require applicants to own public-utility plants, 
equipment, or property created an unworkable “Catch-22,” as it would mean that the company could not apply for 
CPCN unless it already owned property; but under the Public Utilities Act, the company needed a CPCN to 
construct any of those facilities.); see also Ill. Landowners All., NFP v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 90 N.E.3d 448, 455 
(Ill. 2017). Notably, the Commission staff found it “illogical to suggest that an entity [could] not apply for a 
Certificate to construct public utility facilities and transact public utility business unless it already owns [a] public 
utility plant, equipment, or property.” Rock Island Clean Line LLC, Docket No. 12-0560, at 13 (Ill. Commerce 
Comm’n, June 14, 2018) (order on remand), https://www.icc.illinois.gov/docket/files.aspx?no=12-
0560&docId=272967 (follow “Order on Remand” link) [hereinafter “ICC Order on Remand”]. 
127 Ill. Landowners All., 60 N.E.3d at 157. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 159.  
131 See id. (finding that Rock Island does not own or operate any assets in Illinois and that the proposed transmission 
line is not for public use without discrimination).  
132 Id. at 160. 
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not a public utility and could not meet the requirements of the definition under the Public 
Utilities Act, the ICC lacked authority to issue them a CPCN.133  
Following this ruling, the ICC appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois to defend its 
designation of Clean Line as a public utility. The same group of stakeholders continued to argue 
that Clean Line did not meet the definition of a public utility under the Illinois Public Utilities 
Act and, therefore, “the company was ineligible to receive, and the Commission had no authority 
to grant” a CPCN.134 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s ruling that Clean 
Line failed to meet the first requirement of a public utility under the Act as it did not own or 
operate any equipment or property in the state.135 Notably, the court stated that a prior version of 
the Act would have allowed for future ownership of property to qualify, but since the Illinois 
General Assembly repealed that part of the statute, the current law only allowed for present 
ownership of property to qualify.136 Therefore, the court held that since Clean Line could not 
meet the requirements to qualify as a public utility in Illinois, the Commission’s order granting it 
a CPCN failed as a matter of law.137  
Interestingly, the court went on to say in dicta that nothing prohibited new entrants like 
Clean Line from developing their transmission lines as a purely private project.138 The court 
recognized that proceeding in this manner would likely make their operations considerably more 
difficult and cumbersome, but not impossible.139 The court also stated that the Public Utilities 
Act “is based on a model of limited monopoly and reflects a policy of preventing rather than 
promoting competition with existing utilities” 140  even if it did not agree with that policy. 
Ultimately, the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court that since Clean Line did 
not own, manage, or control utility property, it was not a public utility under Illinois law, and 
therefore was ineligible to acquire a CPCN from the ICC.141  
Clean Line’s experience with its Rock Island transmission project in both Iowa and Illinois 
demonstrates just how extreme and diverse state regulatory barriers can be. Clean Line 
emphasized in its testimony to the ICC that the goal of the Rock Island project was to deliver 
wind energy to the Midwest and directly into Illinois, which could help the state achieve its 
Renewable Portfolio Standard goal of acquiring 25% of Illinois’ energy from renewable sources 
by 2025.142 From a state policy perspective, the Rock Island transmission line made sense. And 
in this case, the state PUC was supportive of the merchant transmission developer: the ICC 
                                                        
133 See id. (acknowledging that being a public utility was not a prerequisite to seeking CPCN and that a plain reading 
of the statute demonstrated that an applicant could seek public-utility status while applying for a CPCN; 
nevertheless, the court did not believe that Rock Island qualified as a public utility under the statute).  
134 Ill. Landowners All., NFP v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 90 N.E.3d 448, 457 (Ill. 2017). 
135 See id. at 460 (noting that under § 3-105 of the Act, the company must own, control, operate, or manage, within 
Illinois, directly or indirectly, a plant, equipment, or property to be used in connection with transmission services).  
136 See id. at 460–61 (noting that “the language of section 3-105 stands in clear contrast to its predecessor in plainly 
and unambiguously requiring present ownership, management, or control of defined utility property or equipment in 
order to qualify as a public utility”).  
137 Id. at 462. 
138 See id. (stating that “nothing in the Public Utilities Act prohibits new entrants such as Rock Island from 
commencing development of transmission lines immediately as a purely private project”). 
139 See id. (recognizing that the new entrants would not have the benefit of eminent domain to obtain properties on 
the path of their transmission line). 
140 See id. at 463 (citing Gulf Transp. Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 402 Ill. 11, 19–20 (1948)). 
141 Id. 
142 Emma Foehringer Merchant, Illinois Approves Path to 25% Renewable Energy by 2025, GREENTECH MEDIA 
(Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/illinois-approves-path-to-a-quarter-renewable-
resources-by-2025#gs.r7tTkZA. 
Vol. 14:3]     Meredith Hurley                                                                                                             
 335 
approved Clean Line’s application for a CPCN and supported the development of the 
transmission line. 143  Clean Line followed the established regulatory process as the Public 
Utilities Act of Illinois requires that a public utility obtain a CPCN from the Commission before 
transacting business or beginning new construction within the state. 144  Yet, the confines of 
traditional public utility law enabled the state courts to block Clean Line’s designation as a 
public utility in the state, effectively requiring the company to acquire property in the state and 
demonstrate some benefit to the state before it could proceed with its clean energy project.  
In Iowa, the PUC’s unwillingness to provide a more flexible regulatory review process for 
merchant developer projects created a different kind of barrier to clean energy development. 
Moreover, the Iowa legislature’s willingness to intervene in this area of law created another 
barrier for merchant transmission developers. Clean Line’s experience with this one transmission 
line exposes the areas of the transmission system’s regulatory construct that needs to be updated 
in order to allow for and encourage continued clean energy development.  
3. Regulatory Barriers in Other States 
It is important to note that Clean Line experienced delay and regulatory barriers on several 
of its other transmission lines, including one where it partnered with the federal government.145 
Clean Line’s Plains & Eastern project, which aimed to deliver 4,000 megawatts of wind power 
across the Great Plains, ran into major regulatory barriers and opposition from property owners 
in its path.146 The Oklahoma PUC granted Clean Line the status of “electric transmission-only 
public utility” in 2011, but Clean Line was denied a similar request in Arkansas.147 The Arkansas 
PUC found that Clean Line “could not obtain public utility status in the state because applicable 
law required it to transmit power ‘to or for the public for compensation,’” and Clean Line did not 
have contracts for the sale of electricity to the public.148 Interestingly, the Arkansas PUC also 
recognized that “the law governing public utilities was not drafted to comprehend changes in the 
utility industry such as this one—where a non-utility, private enterprise endeavors to fill a void 
in the transmission of renewable power that is much needed but for which the Commission is 
unable to afford any regulatory oversight.”149 And, unfortunately in 2015, the Arkansas General 
Assembly also enacted legislation that prohibited a merchant transmission developer from 
obtaining a CPCN in the state.150 
In 2016, the U.S. Energy Secretary invoked Section 122 of EPAct 2005, which provides 
the DOE the authority to collaborate with other entities on developing or constructing electric 
                                                        
143 The ICC staff members believed that Rock Island was in the public interest and maintained that “to constitute a 
public use, under Section 3-105, all persons must have an equal right to use the utility, and it must be in common, 
upon the same terms, however few the number who avail themselves of it.” ICC Order on Remand, supra note 121, 
at 15. 
144 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/8-406 (2015). 
145 Karen Uhlenhuth, Clean Line Says Federal Partnership Still an Option for Midwest Projects, ENERGY NEWS 
NETWORK (Mar. 29, 2018), https://energynews.us/2018/03/29/southeast/clean-line-says-federal-partnership-still-an-
option-for-midwest-projects/.  
146 Id. 
147 Klass & Rossi, supra note 65, at 466.  
148 Id. 
149 Id. (citing and quoting Plains & E. Clean Line LLC, Docket No. 10-041-U, Order No. 10 (Ark. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n, Jan. 11, 2011)).  
150 See id. (“Under the new state law, a certificate cannot be issued to an entity that is not currently a public utility, 
primarily transmits electricity, and has not been directed or designated to construct an electric transmission facility 
by an RTO.”).  
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power transmission facilities.151 This partnership was significant because it was the first time the 
DOE “exercised the authority Congress granted it in section 1222 of the EPAct 2005 to 
collaborate on a private project in an effort to overcome state siting and eminent domain barriers 
to an interstate electric transmission line designed to serve multistate regional electricity needs 
and promote renewable energy.”152 Despite this promising partnership with the DOE and the 
completion of major environmental permits necessary for construction,153 Clean Line continued 
to struggle with the Arkansas PUC and litigation over the transmission line. In 2018, after the 
Tennessee Valley Authority withdrew from a wind purchasing agreement with Clean Line, both 
the federal government and Clean Line mutually dissolved their partnership.154 Clean Line cited 
“changes in ownership structure and substantial changes to the nature of the project” as the 
reason for the dissolution, but also noted that the “project was on a much slower track in 
Arkansas and Tennessee.”155 
On yet another transmission line, the Grain Belt Express, Clean Line successfully gained 
approval for the line in three states, but was rejected by a fourth state’s PUC.156 The Missouri 
PUC required agreement from every county the transmission line would run through before it 
would consider approving the line. 157  Fortunately, this determination was overruled by the 
Missouri Supreme Court and remanded to the PUC to determine whether the project was 
“necessary or convenient” for the public.158 In March of 2019, the Missouri PUC issued the 
                                                        
151 See Frank E. Lockwood, Plan to Build Power Line Across State Out of Steam, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Mar. 
24, 2018) https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2018/mar/24/plan-to-build-power-line-across-state-o/ (quoting  
§ 1222 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
16421 (2012)), which gives the Department of Energy the “authority to design, develop, construct, operate, own or 
participate with other entities in designing, developing, constructing, operating, maintaining, or owning . . . electric 
power transmission facilities.” 
152 Klass & Rossi, supra note 65, at 469–70.  
153 Tom Kleckner, DOE Issues Favorable EIS on Plains & Eastern Project, RTO INSIDER, Nov. 7, 2015, 
https://www.rtoinsider.com/doe-eis-plains-eastern-19594/. 
154 Nichola Groom, U.S. Withdraws from Wind Energy Power Line Project, REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-energy-clean-line/u-s-withdraws-from-wind-energy-power-line-project-
idUSKBN1GZ3A2.  
155 Michael Bates, DOE, Clean Line Go Separate Ways on Plains & Eastern Transmission, N. AM. WINDPOWER 
(Mar. 26, 2018), https://nawindpower.com/doe-clean-line-go-separate-ways-on-plains-eastern-transmission.  
156 Id.; Public Service Commission of the State of Missouri, Report and Order on Remand, File No. EA-2016-0358, 
Mar. 20, 2019, at 9, https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/mpsc/commoncomponents/view_itemno_details.asp?caseno=EA-
2016-0358&attach_id=2019013449 (“The Project would traverse the states of Kansas, Missouri, Illinois, and 
Indiana, including approximately 206 miles in Missouri. The Project would deliver 500 megawatts (“MW”) of wind-
generated electricity from western Kansas to customers in Missouri, and another 3,500 MW to states further east.”). 
157 Bryce Gray, Missouri Supreme Court Says State Regulators Erred in Denial of Grain Belt Express Transmission 
Line, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (July 17, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/missouri-supreme-court-
says-state-regulators-erred-in-denial-of/article_a3d5f39d-f342-5916-a35a-46013f899526.html.  
158 Grain Belt Express Clean Line, LLC. v. Public Service Commission, 555 S.W.3d 469, 474 (Mo. 2018). Noting 
that the statute that governed CPCNs in the state—known as “certificates of convenience and necessity” or CCNs—
distinguished between line CCNs and area CCNs. The Supreme Court stated: 
 
In this case, Grain Belt has applied for a line CCN under section 393.170.1. It has not applied for 
an area CCN under 393.170.2 because, according to Grain Belt, it will not be providing retail 
service to electric consumers. Accordingly, it was not required to obtain consents from the 
affected counties before the Commission could issue a line CCN. 
 
Id. at 473-74. 
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unanimous decision of granting the Grain Belt Express transmission line a CPCN.159 In its report, 
the Missouri PUC recognized that a group of municipal utility owners and several cities in 
Missouri had already contracted with Clean Line to purchase transmission capacity rights on the 
line in order to bring renewable energy to their customers.160 It noted that the transmission line 
enabled the municipal power group to utilize cheaper wind power and that the wind contracts 
would save its members over $11 million annually as compared to its current contract for Illinois 
coal resources. 161  The Commission also found that “the Project [would] provide positive 
environmental impacts, since displacement of fossil fuels for wind power will reduce emissions 
of carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxide, and reduce water usage in Missouri.”162 
Unfortunately for Clean Line, the Missouri PUC’s finding that the transmission line qualified as 
a public utility,163 would provide “environmentally-friendly energy,” and, therefore, would be in 
the public interest164 was too little too late—Clean Line had already disbanded and sold the 
rights of the transmission project to another private developer.165 
The experiences of Clean Line over the past decade demonstrate that the application of 
public utility law to merchant transmission developers effectively stagnates or even halts clean 
energy development projects in the United States. Despite the need for additional transmission 
lines to connect areas with high wind power to areas with high demand for electricity, as a 
merchant transmission developer Clean Line ran into too many regulatory barriers to succeed. 
This demonstrates an area in need of significant legal and policy changes in order to help the 
United States both modernize its grid and to enable the utilization of more clean energy sources. 
The next Part provides several proposed solutions for moving the United States in this direction.  
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE AND INCREASE TRANSMISSION LINE DEVELOPMENT 
Recognizing the complexity of the electricity grid and the pace of technological change, 
this Comment presents a variety of legal and policy modifications that could ameliorate 
problems facing transmission line development. From the state perspective, individual states 
need to review and revise their public utility law statutes in light of the dramatic changes the grid 
is undergoing to better recognize new market participants. In addition to amending these state 
utility statutes, reconfiguring the jurisdictional mismatch between state and federal authority over 
transmission lines would go a long way in developing a more efficient process for approving and 
siting new transmission lines.  
Fortunately, the RTOs and ISOs represent a promising area where many of these 
jurisdictional problems may be solved. The RTOs and ISOs are in a favorable position to better 
manage the siting of transmission lines in a larger part of the United States.166 More state and 
                                                        
159 Bryce Gray, After Years of Rejection, Missouri Regulators Give Nod to Grain Belt Express Transmission Line, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, March 20, 2019, available at: https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/after-years-of-
rejection-missouri-regulators-give-nod-to-grain/article_55872edc-1e28-5de9-a7eb-68c01311ab44.html. 
160 Missouri Public Service Commission Report, supra note 156, at 13 and 14.  
161 Id. at 41.  
162 Id. at 46.  
163 Id. at 38 (“Missouri courts have stated that for a company to qualify as a public utility, the company must be 
devoted to a public use for the general public. The evidence showed that when the Project…will transmit energy 
from wind farms in Kansas to wholesale customers in Missouri.”). 
164 Missouri Public Service Commission Report, supra note 156, at 47.  
165 Gray, supra note 157.  
166 I recognize that RTOs and ISOs only manage about 60% of the U.S. electric-power grid and that most of the 
western and southeastern parts of the U.S. would be left out of this proposed solution. Existing organizations in the 
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federal partnerships on new transmission lines with the RTOs and ISOs may work to effectively 
create a happy medium where the regional organizations can use their expertise to overcome the 
jurisdictional mismatch.  
A. State Regulatory Changes: Traditional Public Utility Law Must Adapt 
In addition to modifying federal law, many regulatory changes need to occur at the state 
level. First, states need to review and revise their public utility statutes to better encourage 
growth and incentivize new market entrants that do not have the same characteristics as 
traditional utilities. As new technologies develop, new entrants hope to both enter the market 
with disruptive innovations and challenge entrenched monopolistic utilities that would prefer to 
preserve the status quo.167  Due to their distinctive relationship with the public, utilities are 
regulated in unique and pragmatic ways by the state PUC.168 While this construct works very 
well for public utilities, its application to other companies and their unique business models may 
not be the most effective for encouraging growth and development of the electricity grid within 
the state. Despite their substantial differences, the new market entrants are being channeled 
through the framework of traditional public utility law, often to their detriment.169  
This treatment of new entrants under state law has stacked the deck against them by 
requiring them to seek “public utility status” before acquiring a CPCN. Requiring Clean Line to 
“own, control, operate, or manage” property within a state prior to applying for a CPCN only 
serves to drive up the costs of these much-needed transmission lines.170 The Illinois Supreme 
Court made clear that it was bound by the provisions of the Illinois Utilities Act when reviewing 
decisions made by the Illinois PUC.171 While completing its review of whether Clean Line met 
the qualifications to be considered a “public utility,” the court looked to the governing statutory 
framework of the Public Utilities Act .172 Clean Line believed that it would “qualify as a public 
utility facility and that the service it provides [would] constitute a public utility service within the 
meaning of the Public Utilities Act.”173 Ultimately, as discussed earlier, the Illinois Supreme 
Court found that Clean Line did not meet the statutory requirements of a “public utility,” and the 
court “read the current law as evincing an intention by the legislature to limit the definition of 
‘public utility’ to situations where the subject entity meets the ownership test at the present 
time.”174 This treatment allowed the Illinois Supreme Court to rescind the state PUC’s approval 
of the transmission line “on the technicality that Clean Line did not have a physical presence in 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
West, including the Western Electricity Coordinating Council or the ColumbiaGrid, could potentially provide 
similar transmission planning services, but how that would work within this organization is outside the scope of this 
paper. About 60% of the U.S. Electric Power Supply Is Managed by RTOs, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 4, 
2011), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=790. 
167 Boyd, supra note 16, at 1675. 
168 Id. at 1649. 
169 See BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., CAPITALIZING ON THE EVOLVING POWER SECTOR: POLICIES FOR A MODERN AND 
RELIABLE U.S. ELECTRIC GRID 28 (2013), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/default/files/Energy_Grid_Report[1].pdf (“Under the current siting regime, the developer of a 
multistate transmission line must obtain requisite approvals from state and local authorities along the full length of 
the line, while also obtaining required federal and state environmental approvals.”). 
170 Id. at 39. 
171 Ill. Landowners All., NFP v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 90 N.E.3d 448, 456 (Ill. 2017). 
172 Id. at 457; 220 ILCS § 5/1-101 (2018). 
173 Ill. Landowners All., 90 N.E.3d at 458. 
174 Id. at 461.  
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the state and therefore could not qualify as a utility.”175 This demonstrates how the statutory 
structure of state public utility law needs to change—state legislatures need to expand the 
definitions and applications of public utility codes to allow for new market entrants to bring 
more clean energy projects onto the grid.  
Under the current statutory construct of most states, merchant transmission developers will 
be forced to invest in property at a time that is too early to know if it will be used and useful. 
Merchant transmission developers are also confronted with statutes that either do not allow or 
have not been interpreted to allow for the issuance of CPCNs to companies that do not have 
customers within the state.176 As exemplified in the Rock Island transmission project, merchant 
transmission developers are faced with a Catch-22: they will not have transmission customers 
until the transmission line is built, but are required by some PUCs to demonstrate that they have 
customers before building the line. 177  As Clean Line indicated, the merchant transmission 
developer must start with anchor generation tenants interested in transmission and use them as 
collateral for attracting lenders to help build the line.178  Unfortunately, many of these state 
statutes continue to require merchant transmission developers to look and act as a public utility 
despite the developers’ declarations otherwise. 179  Therefore, traditional public utility law 
definitions and requirements need to be updated to better recognize and incorporate these new 
kinds of companies and services.  
Second, Clean Line’s experience with the Iowa PUC demonstrates other areas of 
regulatory breakdown. In the traditional regulatory construct, public utilities are able to invest 
money in acquiring rights-of-way for large infrastructure projects and can be fairly confident that 
they will be able to recover those investments through electricity rates charged to their 
ratepayers. Merchant transmission developers do not have the luxury of assuming they will make 
back their investments and are therefore unable to spend significant amounts of money prior to 
project approval. Unfortunately, Iowa’s regulatory process only provided a one-step review 
process, which hindered Clean Line’s ability to apply for and acquire a CPCN.180 These kind of 
state regulatory applications of public utility law to private developers simply are inherently 
unfair and result in the stagnation of clean energy projects in the United States. The regulatory 
process itself in many states is not designed to facilitate the consideration of non-utility 
companies. These regulatory processes and procedures need to be updated and likely changed so 
that new market entrants are not treated unfairly in the regulatory review process.  
Third, state statutes that require state PUCs or state courts to interpret the “public interest” 
as only relating to that specific state should be modified to allow for more regional benefits to be 
considered. As this Comment has demonstrated, “individual state authorities may be bound by 
                                                        
175 Gray, supra note 157.  
176 BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., supra note 169, at 39. 
177 See Ill. Landowners All., 90 N.E.3d at 462 (“Echoing the ‘Catch-22’ concerns expressed by the Commission’s 
administrative law judge, . . . interpreting section 3-105 of the [Public Utilities] Act to require present ownership of 
utility infrastructure assets will effectively bar new entrants from qualifying as public utilities and obtaining 
[CPCNs] under section 8-406 of the Act so they may transact business as such.”).  
178 Ill. Landowners All., NFP v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 60 N.E.3d 150, 154 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016), aff’d, 90 N.E.3d 
448 (Ill. 2017). 
179 See Ill. Landowners All., 90 N.E.3d at 462–63 (stating that “the fact there may be barriers and significant costs to 
new companies wishing to enter the state to establish a new public utility is in no way incompatible with the theory 
and operation of the Public Utilities Act. The Act, after all, is based on a model of limited monopoly and reflects a 
policy of preventing rather than promoting competition with existing utilities.”) (citing Gulf Transp. Co. v. Ill. 
Commerce Comm’n, 402 Ill. 11, 19–20 (1948)). 
180 Uhlenhuth, supra note 110. 
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state statutes to accept or reject the project on the basis of their in-state transmission needs, or the 
in-state benefits that the project offers.”181 Especially in regard to pass-through states where the 
transmission line does not begin or end, this can be particularly problematic as state regulators 
and state courts can reject the transmission lines by finding they do not benefit the state. A state 
in the middle of a proposed transmission line path is incentivized to “hold out” on regulatory 
approval of the line because the transmission line will not produce the same benefits for its 
citizens as for the citizens of neighboring states.182 Here, state PUCs and merchant transmission 
developers need to be creative about how to create benefits for the pass-through states—perhaps 
model the system off of a toll road and allow the state to “tax” usage of the line. Or perhaps the 
states themselves could create a benefit system through an energy compact that recognizes the 
middle state as a necessary part of the energy delivered.  
At the end of the day, “[s]tatutes—as well as regulators’ and policymakers’ understanding 
of the public interest—must also evolve beyond the parochial, more narrowly focused model that 
co-existed with traditional public utility regulation.”183 When evaluating interstate transmission 
projects, states should consider moving away from their “state-centric” approach and consider 
the broader benefits to the region.184 This will require regulators to look beyond the need for 
transmission within their own state, which is a “perspective [that] is rooted in the old industry 
model of vertically-integrated, largely insular, monopolies” and recognize that it is “outdated in 
the context of competitive, multistate bulk power markets.”185 
Finally, state legislatures and state PUCs need to recognize that new market entrants can 
help them achieve their own clean energy policy goals. For instance, the clean energy provided 
by these transmission lines can help states achieve their Renewable Portfolio Standard goals or 
any other clean energy goals they may have established for themselves.186 As Clean Line’s 
experience with its Rock Island project demonstrated, the new transmission line was rejected 
despite the fact that Illinois has an established renewable portfolio goal of increasing renewable 
energy options in the state.187 The Missouri PUC recognized the benefits that Clean Line’s 
transmission line would bring the state:  
                                                        
181 BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., supra note 169, at 28.  
182 See Alexandra Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause Review for Interstate Coordination, 
130 MINN. L. REV. 129, 132–33 (2015) (noting that “a government regulator in a ‘pass-through’ state, which would 
neither export nor consume power from a proposed transmission line, is especially likely to face considerable 
interest group pressure to hold out from approving a project.”).  
183 Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving Notions of the “Public 
Interest” in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 705, 712 (2010).  
184 Scholars Alexandra Klass and Jim Rossi have advanced “an argument for revitalizing dormant Commerce Clause 
review of discriminatory state siting and eminent domain regimes, with the goal of better promoting interstate 
coordination in energy markets.” They hypothesize that state regulators who complete a narrow assessment of the 
benefits of a new transmission line could possibly be challenged under the Dormant Commerce Clause, especially if 
the state regulator refuses to take into account any out-of-state or regional benefits associated with a transmission 
line. Klass & Rossi, supra note 182, at 134.  
My personal perspective on that argument is that while it makes sense that, under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
states might be precluded from taking a state-centric view on interstate-transmission development, the Dormant 
Commerce Clause is too blunt of an instrument to motivate states to consider the more regional benefits of clean-
energy development. And such an argument would take too long to be argued in the judicial system.  
186 See N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR. & U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD POLICIES 
(2017), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.pdf 
(demonstrating that twenty-nine states currently have an RPS in place).  
187 See N.C. Clean Energy Tech. Ctr., Renewable Portfolio Standard, DSIRE, 
http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/584 (last updated June 28, 2018) (requiring “large investor-
Vol. 14:3]     Meredith Hurley                                                                                                             
 341 
There can be no debate that our energy future will require more diversity in 
energy resources, particularly renewable resources. We are witnessing a 
worldwide, long-term and comprehensive movement towards renewable energy in 
general and wind energy specifically. Wind energy provides great promise as a 
source for affordable, reliable, safe, and environmentally-friendly energy. The 
Grain Belt Project will facilitate this movement in Missouri, will thereby benefit 
Missouri citizens, and is, therefore, in the public interest.188 
But states’ rejection of interstate transmission development despite intra-state policies and 
support for clean energy may lead to under-investment in future transmission capacity and the 
grid as a whole.189 States should recognize, as the Missouri PUC did, that clean energy projects 
can provide significant benefits for their citizens and find ways to facilitate the projects’ growth 
and development.  
As traditional public utility law was fluid in its early years of development and changed to 
meet the needs of public utilities over time, so too must it now adapt to recognize the changing 
needs of the grid. This represents an opportunity for state PUCs to provide leadership and 
support to both utilities and new market entrants as electricity-based business models change and 
adjust.190 State PUCs have the opportunity to usher in a new era of energy management by 
creating a framework that is experimental, adaptable, and fair for all participants.191 This will 
require the perspective that public utility law is not a single, immutable enterprise, but is an 
open-ended project that is able to adapt and meet the needs of a constantly changing world.192 
“The choice of making a low-carbon future can only be realized if it is approached as a shared, 
political choice--a choice that will require a significant amount of statecraft, public participation, 
and private enterprise, a choice that calls for a revitalized understanding of public utility.”193 
B. A Regional RTO-Centered Regulatory Approach 
At the heart of the jurisdictional issue related to transmission line development is each 
state’s desire to retain authority over what is built within its borders. This is an important 
consideration and a tangible part of federalism that makes interstate projects like the construction 
of transmission lines challenging, but states can retain this authority while also recognizing the 
broader needs of the region. To this end, the expertise and authority of the RTOs and ISOs may 
work in favor of transmission line expansion. If states desire to avoid complete federal 
preemption over interstate transmission development, they may want to consider ceding more 
control and authority to the RTOs on the siting of new transmission lines. Fortunately, RTOs are 
already in an excellent position to act as an intermediary between federal and state power over 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
owned electric utilities (EUs) and alternative retail electric supplies (ARES) to source 25% of eligible retail 
electricity sales from renewable energy by 2025”).  
188 Missouri Public Service Commission Report, supra note 156, at 47. 
189 Hoecker & Smith, supra note 62, at 79. 
190 Boyd, supra note 16, at 1708.  
191 Id. 
192 Id.  
193 Id. at 1710. 
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transmission lines,194 and they are aware of regional transmission needs, thanks to the planning 
processes they complete on an annual basis.195  
There are currently seven RTOs covering service territories that comprise about two-thirds 
of the U.S. population, and they “range in size from single-state (for example, those that serve 
New York and California) to fifteen-state (for example, MISO, the RTO serving the upper 
Midwest).”196 The RTOs were federally created and remain regional representatives of FERC.197  
Yet the RTOs are also granted a considerable amount of deference by FERC and are able to set 
their own agendas as well as provide their own suggested solutions to problems.198 The RTOs 
rely on the voluntary actions of market participants in their regions and utilize the transmission 
lines their utility participants own.199 Without the transmission line owners (generally utilities), 
RTOs could not be established “because the owners need to give up a property right – 
management of the transmission lines – for an RTO to be able to fulfill its duties.”200 Therefore, 
utilities and RTOs are mutually reliant on each other for the efficient and effective coordination 
of the electricity grid. In this position, RTOs are ideally situated to bridge the gap between the 
federal and state governments.201 
1. The Answer: RTO Transmission Siting Boards 
When establishing the RTOs, FERC Order No. 2000 was forward-looking and established 
an “open architecture” policy which allowed the RTOs and its members “to improve their 
organizations in the future in terms of structure, operations, market support and geographic scope 
to meet market needs.”202 This open architecture policy will enable RTOs to be flexible enough 
in responding to the needs of their members and will provide the mechanism that enables RTOs 
to adapt into their new role as transmission siting coordinator.  
Building on Hannah Wiseman’s recommendation that a new form of regional governance 
institution be formed to address the “regulatory commons tragedy in renewable development,”203 
a specific transmission siting board within the RTOs would be an effective way to address the 
stagnation of interstate transmission line development in the United States. As Wiseman states, 
“The boards must be independent institutions with regulatory powers, and they must use these 
powers to resolve overlapping and conflicting rights and provide streamlined yet thorough 
                                                        
194 See Gonzàlez, supra note 5, at 1462 (“With restructuring and the move towards competition, there is increasing 
regional governance through ISOs and RTOs, organizations not constrained by state borders.”). 
195 See Regional Transmission Organizations, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285, at 5 (1999) (Order No. 2000 stated that some of 
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196 See Michael A. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the Public Interest in the 
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processes for the approval of renewable energy siting and construction.”204  While Wiseman 
asserts that these regional energy boards must be independent agencies that do not function 
within an existing federal or state entity,205 I think that RTOs are sufficiently independent to 
avoid the risk of being beholden to either the federal government or to the utility participants 
within their markets.  
It will be more efficient if the RTO transmission siting board operates as a hybrid 
institution that combines multiple levels of authority and “[b]y virtue of this combining, these 
institutions draw from regulatory authority of key stakeholders and foster or force 
collaborations.”206 In order for this structure to be effective, state governments will need to cede 
some authority to this new governance structure, but also retain some power over the decisions 
made by it. This will require, again, updating many state public utility statutes that currently 
prioritize the state PUC’s determination of need for a new transmission line above the RTO’s 
determination of need.207  
Thus, the governance structure of the RTOs will likely need to be changed. A specific 
board that only manages interstate transmission siting will need to be created within the RTO. 
The interstate transmission siting board should be comprised of state representatives who will 
have the opportunity to advocate for or against the siting of a transmission line within or across 
its borders. The RTO transmission siting board will provide a place where states can discuss and 
negotiate the different benefits that may be gained from new interstate transmission lines.208 
Fortunately, many RTOs already have regional state committees which are “comprised of 
state representatives (typically utility commissioners) from the states within the RTO’s 
territory.”209 The interstate transmission siting board would need to have a formalized role within 
the RTO, a governance structure that complies with its members’ recommendations, and a 
requirement that it must explain any major deviations from the recommendations of the board.210 
The exact inter-workings of this governance structure are difficult to define, but they must 
recognize the federalism issues inherent in the decision-making process, provide the RTO with 
the ability to act as a mediator, and create an appeals process that does not require FERC 
review.211 Moreover, procedural protections may be built into the decision-making structure of 
the RTO’s transmission siting board to adequately protect it from federal over-involvement, 
while also empowering the states to participate in the decisions. To this end, it will be necessary 
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in the development of the transmission siting boards that they “create clear hierarchies among 
rights (through pre-emption, if necessary)” and provide a centralized process for applying those 
rights.212  
There are three potential process options for the new RTO transmission siting boards. One 
option is to allow the state PUCs to continue to moderate the need determination process within 
their own states, but then the PUC’s recommendation would be reviewed by the RTO 
transmission siting board. This will allow merchant transmission developers to avoid joining the 
RTO to participate in the siting process, but at the same time will provide a way to appeal the 
state PUC decision to the RTO transmission siting board. This option retains much of the state 
power over the siting process but requires that the decision be reviewed and approved at the 
regional level. But this option also adds another layer of regulatory review, which likely would 
require more time and money spent by all parties involved. The second option is to place the 
project approval of the interstate transmission line within the RTO siting board, but then leave it 
to the individual states to determine the exact route of the line (within reason). This option 
involves almost complete federal pre-emption at the project approval stage but retains state 
authority in the actual geographic siting of the transmission line. A third option is to create a 
streamlined process for project review, approval, and siting within the RTO transmission siting 
board. Under this option, the states lose the most authority and control, but it also decreases the 
regulatory barriers for transmission line developers and likely provides a more efficient path for 
transmission line development.  
It will be integral that utility representatives and state regulators participate on this RTO 
siting board because “they have local knowledge that is vital to the planning for demand and the 
siting of future energy capacity projects.”213 Moreover, these representatives are closer to state-
based and regionally-based problems and must advocate for customers, unlike FERC’s 
management of the wholesale market.214 If FERC and the states are better able to collaborate 
with each other through an RTO, then this could avoid unnecessary litigation and prevent 
potential pre-emption actions.215 
2. Challenges to the RTO Transmission Siting Board 
The creation of these RTO transmission siting boards will be challenging on several fronts. 
First, the risk of federal over-involvement is extremely high yet the RTO transmission siting 
board should be viewed as a viable alternative to complete federal preemption. Moreover, since 
the RTO-state relationship is mutually reliant—the RTO cannot function without the states and 
their utilities’ participation in the RTO—then the states can use their participation in the RTO as 
a negotiating tool. If FERC becomes too involved in the RTO transmission siting boards, then 
the states may allow their utilities to secede from participating in the RTO and bring their energy 
infrastructure with them.  
A second challenge facing this new transmission siting board is that the particulars of 
utilizing eminent domain within each state will need to be determined. Either federal eminent 
domain authority could be vested in the RTO transmission siting board or states would apply 
their own eminent domain authority after being directed to approve a line by the siting board. 
Professor Alexandra Klass suggests that it is “possible to give RTOs siting and eminent domain 
                                                        
212 Wiseman, supra note 203, at 539. 
213 Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 196, at 586.  
214 Id.  
215 Hoecker & Smith, supra note 62, at 96. 
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authority for interstate transmission lines without completely transferring regulatory authority 
over transmission lines from the states to the RTOs.”216 The new RTO transmission siting board 
will require eminent domain authority, either ceded from the states (bottom-up) or provided by 
the FERC (top-down).  
I recognize that my proposed solution of transferring some of the states’ power in the 
transmission siting process to the RTOs will be politically unpalatable to many. This solution is 
also extremely complex from a governance structure standpoint and asks a lot of the RTOs. 
There is concern that pushing states to work at a regional level will result in losing the wide 
variety of public preferences and policies that have resulted from the current framework of state 
control.217 Another concern is that the RTOs “offer considerably less transparent, only quasi-
public frameworks in which to make these critically important decisions.”218 Finally, regional 
market governance could lead to least-common denominator solutions by forcing states into 
positions they would not otherwise be if they retained their state-centric position.219 But the real 
question posed by this section is: will a regional perspective on the siting of transmission lines 
work better than the current state-by-state approach? 
Adding transmission siting coordinator to the list of the RTO’s many responsibilities will 
be challenging, but the RTO is in the best position to manage the wide variety of perspectives 
and to understand the needs of the electricity grid while still allowing utilities to retain ownership 
over the transmission lines. Similar to how the states are viewed as “laboratories of 
democracy,”220 the same concept of social experimentation could be applied to the RTOs by 
allowing each RTO and ISO to determine the ideal participant arrangement of the hybrid 
governance transmission siting board. The exact structure and operating procedures of each 
should be determined by the participants and best suited to the needs of the region.  
As this Comment has demonstrated, the current regulatory construct is not working at the 
state or federal level and changes will require creative regulatory responses. It seems that a 
regional approach may strike a better balance than picking either a solely state or solely federal 
approach. RTOs already make decisions at a regional level and the impacts of their decisions are 
felt by consumers locally. 221  Providing FERC with complete pre-emption power is not the 
answer here because FERC is “not suited to hear locally-oriented issues or complaints about 
regional decisions; its size, skill-set, institutional knowledge, and jurisdictional roots leave the 
FERC with limited awareness of the impacts its actions have on end users.”222 The creation of 
RTO transmission siting boards bridges the federalism gap in this space and provides a tangible 
path forward to encouraging the development of interstate transmission lines in the United 
States. Inserting a more regional perspective into this process may help better align the 
transmission siting regulatory process with the public interest.  
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CONCLUSION 
As new market entrants look to introduce more renewable energy resources onto the grid, 
RTOs and state PUCs face significant challenges in integrating these resources. 223  Grid 
integration studies conclude that in order to encourage higher penetration of renewable 
resources, the grid will have to become more flexible and there must be increased transmission 
capacity. 224  The public utility regulatory construct is not currently adapted to quickly 
incorporating these new forms of energy or new market entrants into the system; therefore new 
rules and procedures are needed in order to accommodate increased access to the grid in a fair 
and open manner.225 
Regulating clean energy projects under traditional public utility law can result in the 
mismanagement and minimization of the projects’ benefits. Many state PUCs still demand that 
merchant transmission developers obtain CPCNs prior to construction, which often requires the 
company to be designated as or to fit within the definition of “public utility.” This monopoly 
construct that is protected under public utility law may not be benefiting ratepayers in the context 
of preventing new entrants from entering the electricity market. The insistence of states and state 
PUCs to apply the requirements of public utility law to merchant transmission developers 
represents a failure in adequately adapting to new players in the market and the growing demand 
for renewable energy. It also results in expensive delays and regulatory uncertainty for future 
clean energy projects. 
In addition to problems at the state level, jurisdictional friction between state and federal 
regulatory bodies over transmission line development has added to the stagnation of clean energy 
development. FERC has been reluctant to assert jurisdiction on projects such as Clean Line’s 
Rock Island transmission project despite recognizing the need for additional transmission 
capacity at the federal level. If a transmission line is being built in one state, but the majority of 
the benefits will be reaped in another state, the PUC in the first state is not incentivized to 
support the project and can block its development. This state-centric mentality locks the 
electricity market into an old model that is no longer working for its consumers. This model 
recognizes benefits from the monopoly construct but has yet to recognize the benefits of the 
decentralized, open market construct. Here, federalism conflicts result in the failure to encourage 
clean energy development and the re-affirmation of the traditional public utility model. 
This Comment’s proposed solution is to create a middle ground where the RTOs manage 
the interstate transmission siting process with the involvement of both the states and the federal 
government. If states want to avoid complete federal preemption in this area, it would behoove 
them to cede some control and authority to these regional entities that are in the best position to 
manage these federalism issues. This will require significant organizational changes to the 
RTOs’ current governance structures, but fortunately FERC already provides a mechanism for 
these changes through the “open architecture” policy it established in Order No. 2000.  
The United States is at a point where the country desperately needs a national policy aimed 
at moving the country’s energy scheme into a new era. Traditional utilities are currently faced 
with a radically changing market in which their services are no longer the only options available 
to their customers.226 Innovative technology and current market changes require a new regulatory 
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regime—one that recognizes the benefits private developers can bring to the electricity market, 
and one that recognizes that these developers are dramatically different from traditional utilities. 
Due to the threat of climate change and the need to decarbonize the electricity industry, our 
society has reached a point where changes need to be made to encourage the development of 
clean energy in the United States. Despite the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement, many states still recognize the need to encourage the growth of renewable energy 
resources.227 This will require states to take on a more regional perspective and consider a 
broader concept of the “public interest.” 
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